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Exploring the underlying structure of mental
disorders: cross-diagnostic differences and
similarities from a network perspective using both a
top-down and a bottom-up approach
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1Department of Psychiatry, University of Groningen, University Medical Center Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
2Department of Psychiatry and Psychology, School of Mental Health and Neuroscience, Maastricht University Medical Center, Maastricht,
The Netherlands
3Department of Psychosis Studies, King’s College London, King’s Health Partners, Institute of Psychiatry, De Crespigny Park, London, UK
4Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Background. It has been suggested that the structure of psychopathology is best described as a complex network of
components that interact in dynamic ways. The goal of the present paper was to examine the concept of psychopathology
from a network perspective, combining complementary top-down and bottom-up approaches using momentary assess-
ment techniques.
Method. A pooled Experience Sampling Method (ESM) dataset of three groups (individuals with a diagnosis of de-
pression, psychotic disorder or no diagnosis) was used (pooled N = 599). The top-down approach explored the network
structure of mental states across different diagnostic categories. For this purpose, networks of ﬁve momentary mental
states (‘cheerful’, ‘content’, ‘down’, ‘insecure’ and ‘suspicious’) were compared between the three groups. The comp-
lementary bottom-up approach used principal component analysis to explore whether empirically derived network
structures yield meaningful higher order clusters.
Results. Individuals with a clinical diagnosis had more strongly connected moment-to-moment network structures, es-
pecially the depressed group. This group also showed more interconnections speciﬁcally between positive and negative
mental states than the psychotic group. In the bottom-up approach, all possible connections between mental states were
clustered into seven main components that together captured the main characteristics of the network dynamics.
Conclusions. Our combination of (i) comparing network structure of mental states across three diagnostically different
groups and (ii) searching for trans-diagnostic network components across all pooled individuals showed that these two
approaches yield different, complementary perspectives in the ﬁeld of psychopathology. The network paradigm there-
fore may be useful to map transdiagnostic processes.
Received 22 April 2014; Revised 3 February 2015; Accepted 3 February 2015; First published online 25 March 2015
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Introduction
Psychopathology is operationalized in diagnostic
classiﬁcation systems of mental disorders that serve
clinical practice. However, it is increasingly accepted
that the disorders in these systems should be seen as
pragmatic, man-made constructs (Kendler et al. 2011;
Frances & Widiger, 2012) that are ﬁxed within time
and within phenomenological boundaries. These con-
structs are meant to guide clinical decision making
rather than represent true concepts underlying symp-
tomatology. Psychopathology does not manifest itself
in ‘natural types’, separated from a mentally healthy
state or into different diagnostic entities by natural
boundaries (Kendell & Jablensky, 2003). Rather, psy-
chopathology may be conceptualized as varying
dimensionally, extending from mild behavioral ex-
pression of liability in the general population to full-
blown clinical disorder (Kendler & Gardner, 1998;
Carter et al. 2001; Krueger & Piasecki, 2002; Angst
et al. 2003; Kendell & Jablensky, 2003; Widiger, 2005;
Van Os et al. 2009; Haslam et al. 2011). High levels of
co-morbidity and high within-diagnosis clinical hetero-
geneity (Kupfer et al. 2002; Widiger, 2005; Widiger &
Samuel, 2005; Hyman, 2010; Kendler et al. 2011) pose
* Address for correspondence: Dr J. T. W. Wigman, Maastricht
University, Maastricht, The Netherlands.
(Email: j.t.w.wigman@umcg.nl)
† Members of MERGE are given in the Appendix.
Psychological Medicine (2015), 45, 2375–2387. © Cambridge University Press 2015
doi:10.1017/S0033291715000331
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291715000331
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteit Maastricht, on 06 Jun 2019 at 07:58:50, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
an additional challenge to categorical classiﬁcation
systems.
In addition to dichotomizing an essentially dimen-
sional construct, current diagnostic systems also are
based on a ‘snapshot’ approach in describing psycho-
pathology (Bystritsky et al. 2012), meaning that they
are based on current, cross-sectional assessments.
Psychopathological symptoms, however, are not static,
but wax and wane over time, and symptoms may
‘emerge or morph’ into other symptoms over time
within one individual (Bystritsky et al. 2012). Thus, cur-
rent diagnostic labels do not do justice to the com-
plexity of mental illness. These diagnoses, however,
still play a dominant role in psychiatric research and,
as such, may hamper scientiﬁc progress in psychiatry.
To better understand psychopathology, a shift from a
diagnosis-speciﬁc focus to a more trans-diagnostic focus,
spanning multiple clinical syndromes, may be pro-
ductive. A large body of research corroborates this no-
tion by showing that factors of risk and resilience for
psychopathology do not inﬂuence separate disorders,
but commonly impact across diagnostic borders
(Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012). To date, no bio-
logical markers have been identiﬁed that are uniquely
associated with a speciﬁc disorder (Kupfer et al. 2002;
Widiger & Samuel, 2005). Instead, genetic effects appear
to be small and polygenic (Buckholtz & Meyer-
Lindenberg, 2012), and do not adhere to traditional
diagnostic boundaries (Kendell & Jablensky, 2003).
Likewise, endophenotypes such as cognitive alterations
also occur in multiple disorders rather than showing
disorder-speciﬁc associations (Weiser et al. 2005; Hill
et al. 2009; Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012).
Additionally, many demographic and environmental
risk factors for psychopathology such as rumination or
the experience of stress increase risk for all diagnoses
(Kessler et al. 1985; Breetvelt et al. 2010; Kessler et al.
2010). To better understand the structure and develop-
ment of psychopathology, it is important to explore
methods revealing underlying patterns of behavior
and experience, yielding quantitative rather than quali-
tative differences within and between individuals with
different clinical syndromes.
Themodel that underlies the current diagnostic system
is one inwhich psychopathological symptoms are seen as
ﬂowing from (i.e. caused by) underlying constructs. For
example, depressive symptoms such as sleep problems,
concentration problems and anhedonia are thought to
be all caused by one underlying construct, i.e. depression
(Borsboom & Cramer, 2013). However, this model may
not be the bestmodel to capture thenature ofpsychopath-
ology. One important drawback of this model is that it
does not assume associations between the individual
symptoms, whereas this does seem plausible (e.g. sleep
problems leading directly to concentration problems
(Borsboom et al. 2011). It has been suggested that the
structure of psychopathology may be better described
as a complex network of components that interact in dy-
namic and nonlinear ways both at biological (Buckholtz
& Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012) and psychological (Kendler
et al. 2011) levels. A network representation of psycho-
pathology at the symptom level proposes that mental
states (referring to psychopathological symptoms, or to
psychological strengths, such as positive affect or resili-
ence) act as nodes in a network which, when activated,
may trigger other mental states (Kendler et al. 2011;
Borsboom & Cramer, 2013). The associations are not
necessarily linear, but can be reciprocal and/or (self-)en-
hancing, creating feedback loops in which, for example,
worrying may cause someone to feel more anxious,
which in turn, may cause this person to feel more
down, which may temper feelings of cheerfulness. This
approach to psychopathology may be useful to capture
all relevant symptoms, irrespective of diagnosis, circum-
venting issues with diagnostic boundaries and
co-morbidity. The strength of the causal connections be-
tween various mental states may differ between indivi-
duals. When several nodes keep reinforcing each other
over time, vicious cycles can arise, from which it may be
difﬁcult to escape (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; Wichers,
2014). Increased connectivity between mental states
may be the force driving onset of mental disorder
(Kendler et al. 2011). Due to feedback loops and increased
network connectivity, an individual may enter a down-
ward spiral and over time develop a cluster of clinically
relevant symptoms.
These ideas need empirical exploration, zooming in
on the details of mental experience. This can be done
by the use of momentary assessment techniques. The
strength of a momentary approach is that it allows
examination of the moment-to-moment experience
(and ﬂuctuation) of current mental states and their inter-
connections (Wichers, 2014). The goal of the present
paper was to examine the concept of psychopathology
from a network perspective, combining two approaches.
First, we took a top-down approach by comparing the
network structure of mental states across different diag-
nostic categories. For this purpose, networks of momen-
tary mental states were compared between individuals
with a diagnosis of depression, a diagnosis of psychotic
disorder or no diagnosis. Based on previous work, we
hypothesized that the networks of individuals with a di-
agnosis would have more and/or stronger connectivity
between mental states over time within and between
mental states compared to those of healthy individuals
(Wigman et al. 2013b). We also expected differences be-
tween networks of individuals with different diagnoses,
each group showing more activation in the nodes that
cover the symptom domains of their respective diagnos-
tic categories (e.g. a more prominent role for feeling
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down in patients with depression). However, we also
expected partial overlap in network activation patterns
between the different diagnoses, given known high
levels of co-morbidity (Kessler et al. 2005; Kessler &
Wang, 2008). Second, to take a different, complementary
look at mental state dynamics, we used a bottom-up,
data-driven approach to explore whether meaningful,
empirically derived clusters of network components
could be identiﬁed to effectively describe the variability
in network structure across individuals of all groups
taken together. We expected that similar mental state
dynamics (e.g. associations between feelings of insecur-
ity and feeling down) would cluster together. Last, to
bring these two complementary approaches together,
we compared the scores of these clusters across the
three original diagnostic groups.
Method
Samples
Data came from eight studies (Table 1) that used
the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) protocol as
described below, and were pooled for the current
analyses. Individuals participating in these studies
represented different diagnostic groups and were clas-
siﬁed as follows (i) healthy subjects, (ii) individuals
with a past diagnosis of depression and current mild
depression and (iii) individuals with a psychotic dis-
order. More detailed information on the separate sam-
ples can be found in online Supplementary Table S1.
ESM
ESM is a structured diary technique that addresses the
daily living environment of participants and its
interactions with the individual. Detailed information
on ESM can be found elsewhere (Myin-Germeys et al.
2009; Wichers et al. 2011). Brieﬂy, participants received
a wristwatch that emitted a beep signal at
quasi-random moments 10 times a day for ﬁve
(Abilify study) or six (other studies) consecutive
days. After each beep, participants were asked to com-
plete a self-assessment diary, thus collecting reports of
thoughts, affect, current context, and appraisals of the
current situation. Adjectives of affect were rated on
7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (‘not at all’) to 7
(‘very’). The following ﬁve items that were present in
all samples were used: ‘cheerful’, ‘insecure’, ‘content’,
‘down’ and ‘suspicious’. Questions were phrased as:
‘At this moment I feel (e.g. down)’.
Analyses
Analyses were performed using Stata v. 12.1
(StataCorp, USA). Visualizations of networks were
done in R (qgraph package; Epskamp et al. 2011).
ESM data have a hierarchical structure with multiple
observations nested within individuals. Given that hi-
erarchical clustering induces violation of the assump-
tion of independence of observations, data were
analyzed using multilevel mixed-effects regression
models, adding random intercepts and random slopes
to the model at the second (individual) level. The Stata
XTMIXED routine was used to accommodate the two
levels of hierarchical clustering, yielding non-
standardized regression coefﬁcients. The covariance
structure of the random intercepts and the random ef-
fects of the time component (‘beep’) was speciﬁed to be
unstructured; the covariance structure of the random
effects of the lagged momentary affect variables
(see below) was speciﬁed as independent.
Table 1. Overview of the pooled ESM studies, participant status and references to original study descriptions
General status Study N Original status Reference
Healthy comparison
subjects
DEUTSCH 26 Controls Van der Steen et al. (in preparation)
MAPS 49 Myin-Germeys et al. (2001)
GROUP 83 Collip et al. (2011), Lataster et al.
(2013)
STRIP 49 Collip et al. (in preparation)
Depression Mind
Maastricht
129 Depression in past, current mild
symptoms
Geschwind et al. (2011)
Psychosis Abilify 19 Psychosis Lataster et al. (2011)
MACS 18 Bak et al. (2009)
Myin-Germeys et al. (2001)
MAPS 43 Collip et al. (2011), Lataster et al.
(2013)
GROUP 66 Collip et al. (in preparation)
STRIP 42 Thewissen et al. (2008)
ZAPP 75
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First, we took a top-down approach to explore the hy-
pothesis that the three different groups have different
networks of momentary mental states. To this end, we
estimated mental state networks for each of the three
groups separately and compared these, based on the
method described in Bringmann et al. (2013). In particu-
lar, the impact of the ﬁve mental states on each other
over time was examined using time-lagged variables in
the multilevel regression models: all mental states at t
were predicted by all other mental states at t−1 and by
a ‘time’ variable (the latter controlling for time effects).
For example, ‘cheerful’ at t was predicted by ‘cheerful’
at t−1, ‘insecure’ at t−1, ‘content’ at t−1, ‘down’ at t−1
and ‘suspicious’ at t−1. The same was done for the
four other mental states. Each of these analyses was per-
formed separately, resulting in ﬁve separate analyses.
This procedure was repeated for the three different sub-
samples. In this way, a network of momentary mental
states was created for each diagnostic group separately.
Networks were constructed based on the ﬁxed-effects
coefﬁcients from the lagged predictors, resulting in a
weighted and directed network that also allows for self-
loops (e.g. ‘content’ at t−1 predicting ‘content’ at t).
To compare the networks of the three groups, several
network characteristicswere assessed, in the formofﬁve
centrality indices (parameters that indicate how central
the position of a node is in the total network;Opsahl et al.
2010; Epskamp et al. 2011). First, node strengthwas calcu-
lated: the sum of the absolute weights of all (incoming
and outgoing) connections that are incident in that
node. This is one index of importance of a speciﬁc symp-
tom: The higher the node strength, themore central is its
position in the network. Second, outward degreewas cal-
culated as the sum of all outgoing connections. The
higher this value is, the more this speciﬁc node
inﬂuences other nodes. Third, inward degree was calcu-
lated as the sum of all incoming connections. The higher
this value is, the more this speciﬁc node is inﬂuenced by
other nodes. Fourth, closeness was calculated for each
node, based on the inverse sum of shortest distances to
all other nodes. An important node in the network
will have high closeness, by being ‘close’ and thus
being able to communicate quickly with other nodes.
Last, betweenness refers to the degree to which a node
lies on the shortest path between two other nodes
(Opsahl et al. 2010; Epskamp et al. 2011). The higher
this value, the higher is the proportion of paths between
other nodes in the network that this speciﬁc node is posi-
tioned on. All centrality indices were calculated based
on absolute values of the signiﬁcant pathways. These in-
dices are used to describe multiple aspects of the con-
nectedness of a network. Comparison of the indices
over the three groups was done descriptively.
For the complementary bottom-up approach, we
pooled data of the three diagnostic groups. Next, we
derived the network connection strengths as described
above using time-lagged multilevel analyses, but now
for each individual separately in the pooled dataset con-
taining all individuals and looked for meaningful clus-
tering of these individual coefﬁcients. So, for each
individual separately 25 (5 × 5) new variables were cal-
culated (i.e. ﬁve mental states, each predicted by the
lagged versions of the same ﬁve mental states). A ﬁrst
obvious step for bottom-up, empirically-based clustering
would be to cluster individuals based on their complete
networks (i.e. at the person level). However, doing this
would again imply that individuals can be segregated
into distinct psychopathological groups, although this
time on an empirical basis. We chose another approach
that seemed more plausible and that would allow mod-
eling of more heterogeneity and gradual differences in
symptomatology between individuals: we hypothesized
that network components (i.e. certain network connec-
tions) may cluster together. Using this strategy, data-
reduction techniques might yield several ‘network
components’ on which individuals and/or groups can
show quantitative differences. We therefore conducted
a principal component analysis (PCA) based on the 25
variables derived from the individual analyses described
above. First, a parallel analysis was used to determine
how many principal components should be extracted
from the data (see O’Connor, 2000 for additional infor-
mation). Parallel analysis is a technique that helps to de-
termine the optimal number of factors to retain in PCA.
A PCA was then performed with the number of factors
to extract based on the results of the parallel analysis,
using an oblique promax rotation (assuming correlated
components). These components were then interpreted.
In this way, we were able to reduce the full palette of
all possible network connection strengths per individual
to a smaller number of network components. Finally,
component scores were estimated for each individual
and the original three groups (diagnosis of depression,
psychotic disorder or no diagnosis) were compared on
their group-average component scores.
Ethical standards
The authors assert that all procedures contributing to
this work comply with the ethical standards of the rel-
evant national and institutional committees on human
experimentation and with the Helsinki Declaration of
1975, as revised in 2008.
Results
Descriptions of the samples
Characteristics of the different samples are presented
in Table 2. The three groups differed signiﬁcantly on
2378 J. T. W. Wigman et al.
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mean scores of all ﬁve mental states (all p < 0.05).
Healthy comparison subjects reported the highest
levels of ‘positive’ momentary mental states (‘cheerful’,
‘content’) and the lowest levels of the ‘negative’ mo-
mentary mental states (‘down’, ‘insecure’, ‘sus-
picious’). Individuals with depression reported the
opposite. Mean momentary mental state levels of indi-
viduals with psychosis were intermediate to those of
controls and individuals with depression for both posi-
tive and negative mental states, with the exception that
they reported similar mean levels of ‘suspicious’ as
individuals with depression. The correlations of all
mental states were moderate to substantial, ranging
between 0.47 and 0.83.
Top-down approach: comparing networks of mental
states over the three groups
In online Supplementary Table S2, all associations be-
tween the ﬁve mental states are listed for, respectively,
healthy comparison subjects, individuals with de-
pression, and individuals with psychosis. Fig. 1 dis-
plays these mental state networks of the three
different groups visually. Comparison of the networks
of mental states over the three groups showed that
healthy comparison subjects have fewest inter-mental
state connections. Positive mental states play an im-
portant role in this group: a positive loop between
‘cheerful’ and ‘content’ is present; also, feeling more
‘cheerful’ and ‘content’ leads to feeling less ‘down’
and less ‘insecure’. The mental state network of indivi-
duals with psychotic disorder showed an intermediate
number of signiﬁcant interconnections compared to
the other two groups. There were some similarities be-
tween the networks of individuals with depression and
individuals with a psychotic disorder. In both, a strong
(positive) loop between the three negative mental
states was present. The main difference between
these networks was that in patients with depression,
many connections were present between positive and
negative emotions, which were almost absent in
patients with psychotic disorder. This is also an inter-
esting difference between the comparison subjects
and the individuals with psychosis: in the ﬁrst group,
there are connections between the positive and nega-
tive mental states that are less clear in the last group.
In the individuals with psychosis, positive mental
states and negative mental states seem to form two
more or less separate loops.
Table 3 shows the centrality indices for the three
groups. Connectedness was higher in the group with
depressed patients than in the other two groups as
indicated by higher values of node strength and by
the fact that the mental states had a higher degree of
inward and outward degree than the other two
groups. The mental states ‘cheerful’ and ‘down’ ap-
peared to play a central role in individuals with de-
pression, since in this group these states showed
shorter path lengths in their connections to other men-
tal states compared to other nodes (and to the other
groups) as indicated by the closeness index. With re-
gard to node strength, it is interesting to see that the
individuals with depression always have the highest
node strength, but that individuals with psychosis
have the lowest node strength for the positive mental
stats and the controls have the lowest node strength
for the negative mental states. Finally, healthy com-
parison subjects differed from the groups with mental
disorder in particular on the inward and outward de-
gree of the negative mental states: compared to the
two patients groups, the comparison subjects dis-
played less connections coming from or going to nega-
tive mental states. With regard to the positive mental
states, the three groups were comparable.
Table 2. Descriptions of different samples
Healthy comparison subjects Patients with depression Patients with psychosis
N 207 129 263
Mean age (S.D.) 34.3 (11.6) 44.1 (9.3) 35.5 (11.0)
Range 16–64 19–65 17–64
Gender
Male (%) 98 (48%) 31 (24%) 179 (68%)
Female (%) 108 (52%) (1 subject missing data) 98 (76%) 84 (32%)
Mean (S.D.) level of mental states
Cheerful 5.0 (1.3) 3.9 (1.6) 4.3 (1.6)
Insecure 1.3 (0.8) 2.7 (1.7) 2.0 (1.5)
Content 5.2 (1.3) 4.1 (1.5) 4.5 (1.7)
Down 1.3 (0.8) 2.5 (1.6) 1.9 (1.4)
Suspicious 1.1 (0.5) 1.7 (1.3) 1.7 (1.3)
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Bottom-up approach: exploring and comparing the
components underlying network associations
Parallel analysis suggested that the coefﬁcients (i.e.
network connection strengths) derived from the indi-
vidual analyses could be reduced to seven components
(Fig. 2). This means that all information that is found in
all individual associations can be reduced to seven
clusters. The loadings represent the relationship be-
tween the respective component and the original as-
sociation (e.g. between ‘cheerful’ at t−1 and ‘down’
at t). The distribution of the coefﬁcients’ loadings
over the seven principal components and the interpret-
ation of these components are shown in Table 4. For
each element, all loadings are shown. When loadings
are in bold listed underneath a certain PC, this
means that particular element is assigned to that
particular PC. Associations that loaded on principal
component (PC) 1 all started with a positive mental
state at t−1. Therefore, this component was interpreted
to reﬂect the ‘impact of positive mental states’. This PC
was less straightforward in its interpretation than the
other PCs. For example, the association between
‘cheerful’ at t−1 and ‘cheerful’ at t loaded negatively
on this PC, where the association between ‘content’
at t−1 and ‘content’ at t loaded positively on it. It is
not completely clear why this PC is more complicated
in its loading patterns. One possible explanation is that
this component is the most general component, tap-
ping also into the other PCs, as the associations that
load highest on this PC also have quite high loadings
on other PCs. This is less the case with other PCs,
where the discrepancy between the highest loading
and the lower loadings is much larger. Associations
of ‘down’ at t−1 with other mental states at t all loaded
on PC2 and thus suggests that this component reﬂects
Fig. 1. Different networks of momentary mental states in healthy comparison subjects, individuals with depression and
individuals with psychosis. In this ﬁgure, the arrows represent associations over time: for example, in the network of healthy
controls, there is an arrow from ‘content’ to ‘cheerful’, meaning that there is an association from ‘content’ at t−1 to ‘cheerful’
at t. Green arrows represent positive associations and red arrows represent negative associations. The fading of the lines
represents the strength of the association: the more solid the line, the stronger the association (and vice versa). For all path
coefﬁcients and their signiﬁcance, please refer to online Supplementary Table S1.
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a ‘negative impact of feeling down’ on other mental
states. PC3 was interpreted as representing ‘positive
impact of suspicion’, since this component involved
associations showing a favorable impact of suspicion
on subsequent mental states. Positive associations be-
tween ‘content’ at t−1 and negative mental states at t
and negative associations between ‘cheerful’ at t−1
and negative mental states at t, all loaded on PC4.
This component was interpreted as representing the
differential impact of ‘active v. passive positive feel-
ings’. Associations of ‘insecure’ at t−1 with other men-
tal states at t loaded on PC5, representing a ‘negative
impact of feeling insecure’ component. Since PC6 cap-
tured associations from only connections between
negative mental states, we interpreted this component
as ‘negative mood reactivity’. PC7 captured only two
associations, both reﬂecting positive associations be-
tween negative moods and originating from ‘sus-
picion’ at t−1. This component was thus interpreted
as reﬂecting ‘negative impact of suspicion’. Together,
these seven components represented seven core com-
ponents of the networks between these speciﬁc ﬁve
mental states, estimated at the individual level and
over time.
Fig. 3 shows mean component scores plotted across
the three groups. Some interesting patterns can be
seen. First, there are two components involving sus-
picion, one with positive and one with negative impact
of suspicion. This suggests that suspicion can also
have a ‘healthy’ function, as long as it does not
persist or leads to subsequent negative mental states.
Individuals with psychosis score higher on both these
components, suggesting that they are more sensitive
to the (positive as well as negative) effects of suspicion,
but that it is mainly the negative effects of suspicion
that deﬁne them as a group with psychotic disorder,
distinguishing them from both the healthy comparison
and the depression groups. Moreover, both groups
Table 3. Centrality indices of the mental state networks of the three groups
Cheerful Content Insecure Down Suspicious
Controls
Inward degree 0.13 0.20 0.10 0.07 0.05
Outward degree 0.17 0.13 0.06 0.10 0.09
Closeness 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.006
Betweenness 3 6 3 0 0
Node strength 0.51 0.48 0.27 0.32 0.21
Patients with psychosis
Inward degree 0.11 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.09
Outward degree 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.21 0.12
Closeness 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.007
Betweenness 0 3 0 8 0
Node strength 0.44 0.38 0.43 0.54 0.34
Patients with depression
Inward degree 0.18 0.28 0.21 0.27 0.10
Outward degree 0.34 0.10 0.22 0.24 0.14
Closeness 0.016 0.009 0.012 0.013 0.008
Betweenness 3 0 1 6 0
Node strength 0.80 0.52 0.68 0.72 0.38
Fig. 2. The number of components as suggested by regular
principal component analysis (PCA) and parallel analysis.
The last number of components suggested by the regular
PCA that is higher than the number of component
suggested by parallel analysis, is suggested to be the best
number of components to retain. In this case, the ﬁrst seven
components suggested by PCA have higher eigenvalues
than the ﬁrst seven components suggested by the parallel
analysis. However, the eigenvalue of the eighth component
suggested by regular PCA is lower than the eigenvalue of
the eighth component suggested by parallel analysis. Thus,
a solution with seven components is suggested to be the
best solution.
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Table 4. The 25 elements that are distributed over the seven components represent the network connection strengths that appear to cluster together (per component) in the total sample of participants. Thus, for
example lower connection strength between downt−1 and cheerful (PC2, connection 1) tends to co-occur with higher connection strength between downt−1 and down (PC2, connection 3)
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7
Interpretation of PC
Impact of
positive affect
Impact of
feeling down
Positive
impact of suspicion
Active v. passive
positive feelings
Impact of
feeling insecure
Negative
mood reactivity
Negative
impact of suspicion
Cheerfult−1 – cheerfult −0.378 −0.151 0.010 0.068 −0.075 0.013 −0.217
Contentt−1 – downt −0.320 0.137 0.016 −0.105 0.012 0.219 0.030
Cheerfult−1 – contentt −0.368 −0.147 0.006 0.020 −0.020 −0.179 −0.162
Contentt−1 – cheerfult 0.483 −0.135 −0.019 −0.063 −0.021 −0.085 −0.155
Contentt−1 – contentt 0.527 −0.120 0.037 −0.103 −0.067 0.107 −0.178
Cheerfult−1 – downt 0.230 0.117 −0.056 0.201 0.047 −0.129 0.075
Downt−1 – cheerfult 0.039 −0.480 0.039 0.057 0.158 −0.109 0.013
Downt−1 – contentt 0.093 −0.510 −0.083 −0.023 0.139 0.017 0.041
Downt−1 – downt −0.042 0.466 0.052 0.004 −0.004 −0.067 0.121
Downt−1 – suspicioust 0.043 0.250 −0.076 0.123 0.168 −0.226 −0.194
Suspicioust−1 – downt 0.020 −0.037 −0.488 −0.061 −0.032 0.070 0.178
Suspicioust−1 – cheerfult 0.012 −0.022 0.543 −0.032 0.115 −0.078 0.210
Suspicioust−1 – contentt −0.010 0.059 0.564 −0.018 −0.046 0.021 0.127
Contentt−1 – suspicioust 0.069 0.099 −0.027 −0.542 0.019 0.106 0.167
Contentt−1 – insecuret −0.152 0.088 −0.118 −0.258 0.148 −0.154 0.033
Cheerfult−1 – suspicioust −0.100 0.021 −0.051 0.604 0.042 −0.003 −0.028
Cheerfult−1 – insecuret 0.040 0.092 0.038 0.380 −0.040 0.170 0.249
Insecuret−1 – cheerfult −0.013 0.135 −0.071 0.002 −0.598 0.017 −0.117
Insecuret−1 – contentt 0.054 0.060 −0.001 −0.002 −0.588 −0.104 −0.040
Insecuret−1 – downt 0.007 −0.056 −0.022 0.022 0.387 0.256 −0.058
Downt−1 – insecuret 0.037 0.314 0.010 −0.078 0.129 −0.403 −0.022
Insecuret−1 – insecuret −0.055 0.039 0.233 0.122 0.209 0.474 −0.172
Insecuret−1 – suspicioust 0.092 0.052 −0.078 −0.135 0.059 0.559 −0.188
Suspicioust−1 – insecuret −0.109 −0.092 −0.306 0.081 0.006 −0.010 0.400
Suspicioust−1 – suspicioust −0.069 −0.075 0.132 −0.086 0.082 −0.169 0.690
PC, Principal component.
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with a psychiatric diagnosis score higher on the ‘im-
pact of insecure’ component than the healthy compar-
isons, suggesting that this is a general component of
mental illness that might be present across multiple
psychopathological dimensions. Last, individuals
with depression not only score lowest on both positive
and negative impact of suspicion, but they also score
lowest on the component ‘impact of positive feelings’.
This may reﬂect (and perhaps partly explain) why
this group reports depressive, and not psychotic,
symptomatology.
Thus, the associations of the mental state networks
cluster together in several components, that can vary
between individuals and/or groups, sometimes differ-
entiating between healthy controls v. patients, some-
times between patients with different disorders,
sometimes between controls and individuals with
one disorder together v. individuals with another dis-
order and sometimes between all three groups.
Discussion
We investigated the structure of psychopathology from
a dynamic network approach, showing how momen-
tary assessment techniques can be used to expose the
underlying micro-structure of psychopathology. The
hypothesis that individuals with a clinical diagnosis
had more strongly connected mental state network
structures was conﬁrmed. They showed stronger men-
tal state cross-reactivity and persisting of affect over
time. This ﬁnding was most robust for the depressed
group. Furthermore, networks of individuals with a
psychiatric diagnosis contained loops which may
catch individuals into a downward spiral of negative
mental states. There were also differences between
the two diagnostic groups: the depressed group
showed more interconnections between positive and
negative mental states than the psychotic group.
This top-down approach was followed by a comp-
lementary bottom-up approach in which we derived
components of psychopathology based on a clustering
of the empirically derived network structures: all poss-
ible connections over time between the ﬁve mental
states (‘cheerful’, ‘content’, ‘down’, ‘insecure’ and ‘sus-
picious’) were clustered into seven main components
that together captured the main characteristics of the
network dynamics. These components involved (i)
the impact that speciﬁc states or groups of mental
states have in the network, (ii) dynamics between
negative and positive states, or active and passive
states, and (iii) reactivity between negative mental
states. Associations between these empirically derived
components and the diagnostic groups as deﬁned by
current classiﬁcation systems showed that these two
approaches yield different, complementing perspec-
tives in the ﬁeld of psychopathology.
A network approach to psychopathology
Some interesting features were found in the networks
of different diagnostic groups in the top-down ap-
proach. In all three groups, a positive loop between
feeling ‘cheerful’ and ‘content’ was present. Of interest
here is that this loop was the strongest in the depressed
group, which seems unexpected; also, in individuals
with psychosis, this loop seemed more ‘disconnected’
from the network of negative mental states. This sug-
gests that positive mental states play a central role in
all human mental processes, i.e. in both healthy and
more pathological states. The mental state network of
individuals with psychosis was dominated by two
loops: a positive loop between ‘cheerful’ and ‘content’,
Fig. 3. Mean component scores for the three groups. Only the difference on PC5 is signiﬁcant (p < 0.05). PC1: Impact of
positive affect. PC2: Impact of feeling down. PC3: Positive impact of suspicion. PC4: Active v. passive positive feelings. PC5:
Impact of feeling insecure, PC6: Negative mood reactivity. PC7: Negative impact of suspicion.
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which was similar as the one in the healthy compari-
son group, and another loop that involved reinforcing
effects between the three negative mental states. The
two loops are connected by the negative impact of feel-
ing ‘content’ on feeling ‘down’. Once an individual
ends up in the negative loop, negative mental states
keep reinforcing each other. In the depressed group,
a similar negative loop between the three negative
mental states was found. In this group, however, nega-
tive loops also existed between ‘cheerful’ and ‘down’
and ‘cheerful’ and ‘insecure’, which were absent in
psychosis. In other words, negative mental states not
only reinforced each other but also impacted nega-
tively on the active positive state of feeling ‘cheerful’
in depressed individuals. Less cheerfulness in turn
fueled the negative mental state loop. Also, in the de-
pressed group, negative mental states decreased ‘con-
tent’, whereas in the controls the opposite occurred:
‘content’ reduced feeling ‘insecure’ and ‘down’. Thus,
network dynamics may explain why some individuals
end up depressed whilst others do not. Some indivi-
duals have a structure in which negative mental states
not only tend to accumulate but in which negative
states, additionally, suppress positive emotional states.
The fact that the latter was absent in the psychosis
group may explain why this group, although experi-
encing negative mental states, was not primarily
labeled with a mood disorder.
The network approach shows how both quantitative
(e.g. the same association in two groups, but different
in strength) and qualitative differences (e.g. presence of
a certain association in one group but its absence in
another) between individuals together inﬂuence vul-
nerability for developing certain psychopathological
states. Transfer between (in particular negative) mental
states is less strong (quantitative differences) in healthy
individuals compared to individuals with higher levels
of psychopathology, which is in line with earlier work
(Wigman et al. 2013a). But also the speciﬁc connections
and combinations of loops (qualitative differences)
appear important in specifying the kind of psycho-
pathology an individual may develop.
Traditional momentary assessment analyses show
each of the effects separately. Using a network ap-
proach, we tried to bring these effects together. It
shows the inherent complexity of interconnections of
mental states and how certain parts of a system can
inﬂuence the total system (Wichers, 2014). The princi-
ples of dynamic system theory may be applied to the
development of psychopathological states in terms of
changes in network connectivity (Borsboom &
Cramer, 2013; Van de Leemput et al. 2013). Slow quan-
titative increases in network connections may reach a
threshold at which a sudden qualitative change occurs.
We can illustrate this with an example – based on the
psychosis network structure (Fig. 1) – in which the
negative connection between feeling ‘content’ and
‘down’ would slowly increase in a hypothetical individ-
ual. At ﬁrst, this person is healthy, experiencing few
negative mental states. When this person experiences
a major stressor, this can strongly reduce the person’s
contentment, which in turn can trigger a large enough
increase in feeling ‘down’ that the negative loop is acti-
vated. At that moment, a quick accumulation of nega-
tive mental states may arise. These mental states may
keep reinforcing each other, bringing about a qualitative
change that is diagnosed as psychosis. Thus, the net-
work approach may provide us with a plausible new
perspective on the mechanisms of psychopathology.
In the context of classiﬁcation of psychopathology
The bottom-up approach shows the possibilities of think-
ing outside the boundaries of diagnostic classiﬁcation,
investigating psychopathology based on empirically de-
rived network structures. These network structures ex-
pose the emotional dynamics that may form the basis
of a person’s vulnerability to psychopathology.
Although current classiﬁcation systems such as the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental Disorders
(DSM) are conceptually and clinically very appealing
and useful, an empirical classiﬁcation may offer a comp-
lementary approach to better understand the underlying
dynamics that may be at the core of psychiatric symp-
toms. For example, person A and B may both fall in the
DSM-5 category of major depression butmay experience
different symptom patterns. Examining their network
structures as clustered in the components that were iden-
tiﬁed, these individuals may display dynamic patterns
between symptoms that differ substantially. For exam-
ple, for person A, who scores high on negative mood re-
activity, the impact a negative emotion persists over time
and may trigger a cascade of other negative emotions
(PC6). Person B, on the other hand, may experience
that negative emotions speciﬁcally diminish his positive
emotions (PC1). These individual differences in vulner-
ability may explain differences in symptom reports and
may require different treatment strategies.Anetwork ap-
proach may thus complement traditional diagnostic
practice, helping to better understand similarities and
differences across diagnostic groups.
Wewish to stress that the two approacheswe used are
complementary. Although Fig. 3 shows that DSM diag-
nostic classiﬁcation is different from the bottom-up clas-
siﬁcation, there are also consistencies. In the psychosis
group, for example, suspicion is more likely to trigger
negative emotions (PC7). Likewise, individuals in the de-
pressed group score on average lower on the impact of
positive emotions (PC1) and higher onnegativemood re-
activity (PC6). The current network perspective on
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psychopathology may help to explain the large hetero-
geneity within clinical diagnostic groups as well as the
fuzzy separation and existing co-morbidity between dis-
orders. It furthermore challenges us to regard psycho-
pathology not as a large set of different, separate
mental disorders, each ﬂowing from its own underlying
cause, but as the result from one underlying explanatory
principle, namely the interconnectivity between mental
states that underlies these symptoms.
Strengths and limitations
An important strength of the current study is that it
used data from a large, pooled dataset which allowed
us to compare three large groups, representing different
levels and types of psychopathology. The combination
of a top-down and a bottom-up approach to psycho-
pathology using network methodology is innovative.
As data were originally collected for other research
questions, the analyses of the current paper are second-
ary. Important limitations that follow from this are that
only three diagnostic groups, and ﬁve speciﬁc mental
states were included. Participants in each diagnostic
group came from multiple studies. This is an advan-
tage, since larger numbers increase statistical power,
but also a disadvantage because the participants in
each diagnostic group thus form a quite heterogeneous
subgroup, and may have different current levels of
symptomatology. The most heterogeneous group is
the group with individuals with psychosis, as this
group included individuals with different levels of cur-
rent psychosis (i.e. acutely psychotic and not currently
psychotic but nevertheless diagnosed with psychotic
disorder). Therefore, interpretation of the results should
be carefully considered and replicated in future work.
Although diagnostic groups are in general quite hetero-
geneous and consist of individuals with large differ-
ences in their symptomatology (Kupfer et al. 2002;
Widiger, 2005; Widiger & Samuel, 2005; Hyman, 2010;
Kendler et al. 2011), more research is needed to replicate
and extend our ﬁndings. Future research should also in-
clude a broader spectrum of symptomatology so trans-
diagnostic processes can be truly investigated. This is a
ﬁrst, explorative study which needs replication and
further research. For the current analyses, we have cho-
sen to use PCA to reduce the total possible associations
between the ﬁve mental states that were included in this
study. Since there is a subjective component to this ap-
proach in the interpretation of the components, these
results should be replicated and other methods, on
other data, should be explored as well. Although we
have used a network approach to examine the dynam-
ics of mental states over time, we used separate analyses
for each mental state. Although the covariance structure
in the models was speciﬁed as unstructured for time,
thus allowing for dependence across error variances
where we most expected it, it was not possible to use
the unstructured option for all effects in the model.
Although it is possible that these effects actually are de-
pendent, specifying them to be so led to problems with
model estimation because the models then became too
complicated and did not converge. Thus, the random
effects of the lagged variables were speciﬁed to be inde-
pendent to enable model conversion. In future research,
more sophisticated techniques may be used to map
mental state interconnectivity directly in one analysis.
Comparison of the networks of the three groups was
done descriptively. The networks could not be statisti-
cally compared because, currently, there is no reliable
and valid way to do that. Network techniques com-
bined with this type of data constitute a new ﬁeld with-
in psychiatry that is currently strongly under
development. Likely, improved statistical techniques
will be available within a few years and formal com-
parison of networks through e.g. comparison of central-
ity indices will be possible.
Clinical implications and future directions
This is a ﬁrst attempt to explore the dynamic connec-
tivity of basic experiential units that may underlie psy-
chopathology. Although evidence for its validity is
now starting to accumulate, more research is needed
to further establish the diagnostic value of the network
approach to psychopathology. Potentially, this ap-
proach may have high clinical relevance in exposing
personalized vulnerability structures regarding the
emotional dynamics that take place in daily life.
Furthermore, it may help to better identify what speciﬁc
disorder an individual ismore likely to develop, an indi-
vidual’s capacity to recover and to assist in making per-
sonalized decisions regarding the timing and choice of
intervention. More research, however, is needed to
further examine the potential for the network approach
to (i) assess individual changes in network structure, (ii)
predict level and type of future psychopathology, and
(iii) predict capacity for recovery. Future research may
also explore the differences in network dynamics be-
tween genders, as our results (different male:female
ratio in the different diagnostic groups), and previous
research (Rosenﬁeld & Mouzon, 2013), suggest that
problems in affect and affect dynamics differ substan-
tially between men and women.
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